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This study uses detailed, reliable and up-to-date linked employer-employee data that take
account of both the demand and the supply side of the labor market to challenge the
conventional wisdom of a universal exporter wage premium. It investigates whether for
German establishments an exporter wage premium can be found irrespective of export
destination and the distance between export origin and destination. As expected, it ﬁnds
that exporters generally pay higher wages than non-exporters. But it also shows that
only exporting to certain countries is associated with a wage premium. Moreover, such a
premium exists only for establishments that ship goods over a relatively long distance.
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1. Introduction
Traditionally, models of international trade focused on the industry level and ignored
ﬁrm heterogeneity. In a seminal study Bernard and Jensen (1995) used detailed micro
data to show that this view omits important differences between ﬁrms engaged in export
activities and those that only serve the domestic market — perhaps most prominently that
exporters on average pay higher wages (and are accordingly more productive). During the
last 15 years a growing body of literature — surveyed in Greenaway and Kneller (2007),
Wagner (2007a) and Wagner (2011) — has used very diverse methods and datasets to test
whether exporters really pay higher wages and overwhelmingly conﬁrmed this assertion.
What is more, starting with Melitz (2003) the New New Trade Theory has developed
models where heterogeneous ﬁrms are explicitly included and the decision to export is
endogenously determined on the ﬁrm level. The usual result of these models is that only
the most productive ﬁrms become exporters. Thus they provide a theoretical rational for
the empirical ﬁndings by Bernard and Jensen (1995) and subsequent research.1
This study’s contribution is to empirically reconsider the exporter wage premium. It
seeks to ﬁll research gaps in three interrelated areas: First, the majority of the relevant
empirical literature relies on ﬁrm data, omitting individual characteristics of workers
that might inﬂuence their wages. In contrast, this study uses detailed linked employer-
employee data that account for both the supply and the demand side of the labor market
and allow to control for observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity. Second, although
recent theoretical models by Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2008) and others suggest that
the relationship between ﬁrm performance and exporting depends on the destination of
exports, this has rarely been tested. This study belongs to the very small number of
papers that employ linked-employer-employee data to distinguish between the exporter
wage premia for different export destinations. Third, a straightforward extension of the
Melitz model developed by Holmes and Stevens (2010) implies that the exporter wage
premium depends positively on distance. This study is — to the author’s best knowledge
— the very ﬁrst to explicitly consider the inﬂuence of the distance between an export’s
origin and its destination on the exporter wage premium in the context of heterogenous
ﬁrms and endogenous exporting activity.2
This study’s ﬁrst result conﬁrms the existing literature: Even if one controls for worker
characteristics, exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters. Its second ﬁnding is more
novel: For German ﬁrms only exporting to the eurozone and non-European economies is
1 In many New New Trade Theory models labor is homogenous and payed its marginal product and though
exporters are more productive than other ﬁrms, there is no room for an exporter wage premium. At the same
time, it is a stylized fact from the literature on rent-sharing that more productive ﬁrms pay higher wages [cf.
Blanchﬂower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) and also Egger and Kreickemeier (2010) that explicitly model an
exporter wage premium because of rent-sharing].
2 In their whole study and especially in their (descriptive) empirical investigation Holmes and Stevens
(2010, p. 8) focus on plant size instead of wages or productivities. They note that in the context of the Melitz
model“(p)roductivity(...) scalesupplantsize”. Besides, resultsbyRuaneandSutherland(2005)andAlcalá
and Hernández (2010) could be interpreted as pointing to a positive relationship between distance and the
exporter wage premium even though distance measures are not explicitly included in their regressions.
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associated with a wage premium. Exporters to Central and Eastern European countries
pay the same wages as non-exporters ceteris paribus. In a third step, a closer analysis of
ﬁrms exporting to countries in the European Monetary Union and the New EU Member
States shows that a positive exporter wage premium is always present for longer distances
between an export’s origin and its destination. But exporters located close to their desti-
nation pay the same or even lower wages than non-exporters.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the re-
lated theoretical and empirical literature while Section 3 introduces the linked employer-
employee dataset and its most important features. Section 4 contains the main results





One reason why exporters might be more productive and accordingly pay higher wages
than other ﬁrms is given by the so-called “learning by exporting”-hypothesis elaborated
for instance by Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998). “Learning by exporting” models argue
that exporting ﬁrms may increase their technological knowledge through the access to
new production methods or new product designs from their buyers and thus become more
productive than non-exporters.
An even more prominent explanations for the exporter wage premium starts with the
premises that exporters are comparatively more productive even before they begin to ex-
port. In this context, the New New Trade Theory has developed models — starting with
Melitz (2003) — that combine ﬁrm heterogeneity with a monopolistic competition frame-
work. In these models, a ﬁrm’s productivity is exogenous but the decision to export is
endogenously determined on the ﬁrm level. The usual result is that only some ﬁrms are
productive enough to bear the ﬁxed costs associated with international trade and that these
ﬁrms self-select into exporting.
A related framework developed by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) also
connects ﬁrm heterogeneity with exporting but does not rely on monopolistic but instead
on oligopolistic Bertrand competition. As in the Melitz model only the most productive
ﬁrms endogenously start to export. But this time the reason why only the most productive
ﬁrms export is that they enjoy cost advantages over their competitors and therefore can
ﬁx lower prices.
Recently, various extensions of these relatively basic New New Trade Theory models
have been developed. A prominent strand of literature introduces asymmetric countries
and asymmetric ﬁxed costs of exporting. Chaney (2008), Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2008) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) develop models where for instance
because of varying institutional structures, familiarity, language or — in the spirit of
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) — competitive pressure the ﬁxed costs of
exporting differ by export destination. As a result, productivity thresholds also differ
from country to country, exporter self-selection operates market by market and a sort of
hierarchy emerges among the various export destinations. Firms with a relatively low
productivity threshold serve only those markets where the ﬁxed costs of exporting are
relatively low but more productive ﬁrms are able to sell their goods in more countries.
A modiﬁed version of the Melitz framework developed by Holmes and Stevens (2010)
stresses the importance of distance. In addition to the sunk costs of international trade
present in the basic model, Holmes and Stevens (2010) introduce sunk costs associated
with distance. These are meant to capture costs — for instance for setting up a distribution
network — faced by a ﬁrm that wants to sell its products far away from its location,
irrespective of whether this means an engagement in intra- or international trade. In the
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model, ﬁrms can make one investment to overcome distance barriers and a second one
to overcome border barriers. Eventually, “(t)he larger market of a more productive plant
will make it more willing to pay ﬁxed cost (...) both with regards to the distance friction
as well as the border friction” (Holmes and Stevens, 2010, p. 9). So those exporters that
ship their goods over the greatest distance are expected to pay higher wages than other
exporters.
Finally, Verhoogen (2008) adds quality differentiation to the Melitz framework. In his
model ﬁrms endogenously decide not only whether to export or not but also whether
to produce high- or low-quality goods. This new mechanism linking trade and wage
inequality is used to explain how quality upgrading leads Mexican ﬁrms that export to the
United States to pay higher wages than non-exporters. Brambilla, Lederman and Porto
(2010) extend Verhoogen’s (2008) framework to allow for different export destinations
and also incorporate biases in factor demands along the lines of Matsuyama (2007).
2.2. Empirical Literature
This study is related to the large body of literature that during the last 15 years has used
very diverse methods and datasets to test whether exporters really pay higher wages. This
literature has been surveyed in Greenaway and Kneller (2007), Wagner (2007a) and Wag-
ner (2011) and overwhelmingly conﬁrms the existence of an exporter wage premium.
More speciﬁcally, this study is connected to the far smaller number of papers that use
linked employer-employee data to investigate the exporter wage premium. These in-
clude Munch and Skaksen (2008) for Denmark, Alcalá and Hernández (2010) for Spain
and Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007), Baumgarten (2010), Klein, Moser and Urban
(2010) and Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2010) for Germany.3
Another related strand of literature investigates the connection between the exporter
wage premium and other features of ﬁrms like their ownership structure (Cole, Elliott and
Virakul, 2010) or their size (Máñez-Castillejo, Rochina-Barrachina and Sanchis-Llopis,
2010). So far, only relatively few empirical studies have investigated whether the exporter
wage premium varies by export destination. Here, Ruane and Sutherland (2005) ﬁnd that
destination matters and that the performance characteristics of Irish ﬁrms that export to
markets beyond the UK differ from those that export “locally”. Alcalá and Hernández
(2010) — to the author’s best knowledge the only existing study that employs linked-
employer-employee data to distinguish between exporter wage premia for different export
destinations — use Spanish data to conﬁrm that different destinations are associated with
distinctive wage premia. Additionally, Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2010) document
that only those Argentine exporters that export to high-income countries pay higher av-
erage wages than domestic ﬁrms while Wagner (2007b) and Verardi and Wagner (2010)
3 The relationship is especially strong with Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) who use the same data
source but analyze a more dated time period and also differ concerning certain methodological issues and
the exact focus. Still, this study’s ﬁrst set of contributions (described in Section 4.1) could be seen as a —
successful — attempt to replicate the results by Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007).
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ﬁnd that German ﬁrms that export beyond the eurozone are (slightly) more productive
than those that sell their goods only within the euro area.
This study is also related to the empirical exercise by Holmes and Stevens (2010). The
authors investigate the role of the distance between export origin and destination in the
context of a generalized Melitz framework and ﬁnd that this distance indeed plays an
important role. However, their analysis is purely descriptive and — in contrast to the
majority of the relevant literature or this study — focuses on the relationship between
exports and ﬁrm size (and not wages or productivities).
5OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG Working Paper No. 305
3. Data
This study relies on the cross-sectional model of the Linked Employer-Employee Data
(LIAB) of the Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg (IAB) [cf. Alda, Bender
and Gartner (2005)]. The LIAB is created by the merger of two datasets. Its ﬁrst source
is the IAB Establishment Panel, an annual survey which asks German establishments
about various topics ranging from the development of employment to business policies,
investments, in-house innovations, wages, working hours and training programmes. The
IAB Establishment Panel relies on a stratiﬁed sample of German establishments — where
the strata are deﬁned over industries and plant sizes — and has been conducted annually
since 1993.
For the LIAB, the IAB Establishment Panel data are matched with individual data form
the German Employment Register also collected by the IAB. Thus detailed data for all
individuals employed by any establishment covered by the IAB Establishment Panel is
available, including socio-demographic characteristics (like year of birth, nationality or
education) as well as employment characteristics (gross earnings, occupation, etc.). Be-
cause records from the Employment Register are used to compute both social security
contributions and unemployment beneﬁts, data drawn from it are highly reliable.
Altogether, the LIAB covers up to 16,000 establishments with approximately 1.8 to 2.5
million employees per year. It seems to be ideally suited for a simultaneous analysis of
the supply and demand sides of the German labor market.
This study focuses on the years 2003 to 2006 and two key variables: The log of wages
as the dependent variable and the export status as the key regressor. Wage information
is available both on the establishment and the individual level. For establishment level
regressions information on the establishments’ wages per employee are used while for
individuals the Employment Register lists their wage levels subject to social security con-
tributions. That is, individual wage information is only recorded up to the contribution
assessment ceiling of Germany’s social security system and right-censored at this ceiling.
Not taking account of this censoring and estimating an ordinary least square regression
of individual wages would lead to inconsistent results. In this study the homoscedastic
single imputation algorithm based on a Tobit model suggested by Gartner (2005) is used
to impute individual wages above the censoring point.
Concerning the export status, this study relies on a dummy variable that indicates
whether or not an establishment exports at all in a given year. Additionally, the IAB
Establishment Panel allows the distinction between exports to three country groups for
the years 2003 to 2006: members of the European Monetary Union (EMU), New EU
Member States (NMS) and the rest of the world (ROW).4
4 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain formed the EMU during the period covered (together with Germany). The New EU Member States
encompass Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia.
Slovenia adopted the euro in January 2007 but was listed as an EMU member in the questionnaire of the
last wave of the IAB Establishment Panel considered here (for which interviews were conducted in 2007
with the relevant question focusing on 2006). Henceforth, it will be counted among the New EU Member
States.
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Figure 1: Centroids of the New EU Member States and German counties
Together with wages and the export status, this study’s third central variable is the dis-
tance between the exporting establishment and the export destination. Following Holmes
and Stevens (2010) and because the LIAB only allows the distinction of two meaningful
export destinations — the eurozone and the New EU Member States — the focus is on the
geographic variation inside Germany. Regressors measuring the distance between export
origin and destination are obtained by the following four-step procedure: First, geograph-
ical centers of gravity are calculated for the eurozone, the New EU Member States and
every German county. In order to identify economically meaningful centroids, the geo-
graphical data are weighted by countries’ average GDPs for the time span 2003 to 2006
in euros (obtained from Eurostat) for both the EMU and the NMS centroids.5 Second, the
great-circle distance — which takes account of the fact that the Earth is approximately
spherical — between each county’s centroid and the centers of gravity of the two coun-
try groups is measured. Third, county codes available in the IAB Establishment Panel
are used to merge this geographical information with the linked employer-employee data.
Fourth, two dummy variables are created and set to one for all those establishments fur-
5 The resulting centroid for the eurozone is located close to the French city of Lyon while the one for the
New EU Member States lies in Southern Poland, not too far away from Katowice.
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ther away from the EMU and NMS centroids than the respective median distance and zero
for all other establishments.6
For German counties’ distances to the NMS the whole procedure is visualized in Fig-
ures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows boundaries and centroids of the New EU Member States and
German counties. Figure 2 adds distances and the resulting binary classiﬁcation of Ger-
man counties. Similar ﬁgures could of course be drawn for German counties’ distances
to the EMU.
Figure 2: Distances between centroids of the New EU Member States and German counties
AnumberofothervariablesareincludedinthewageregressionsinSection4ascontrols
and also because assessing their effects on wages might be interesting in themselves: For
the establishment-level regressions these are the number of employees subject to social
security contributions, the square of this variable, the capital per employees subject to
social security contributions and average weekly standard hours. Together with industry,
state and year ﬁxed effects, dummy variables are included for the existence of an industry-
or an establishment-wide collective bargaining agreement and for the presence of a wage
council.
6 All geographical calculations are performed with Esri’s ArcGIS. Data on the boundaries of countries and
GermancountiesstemfromEsriandGermany’sFederalAgencyforCartographyandGeodesy, respectively.
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For the individual-level wage regressions all establishment-wide control variables are
againtakenintoaccount. Additionally, individualage, agesquared, tenure, tenuresquared
and education level as well as dummies for German nationality and the status as master
craftsman / foreman or white-collar worker are included. Moreover, following Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis (1999) “spell” ﬁxed effects are included, where “spells” are de-
ﬁned as unique employee-establishment combinations. The inclusion of “spell” ﬁxed
effects means that both establishment and individual (time-invariant) unobserved hetero-
geneity is accounted for and that only those differences between two consecutive obser-
vations are used where the employee does not change his or her employer between the
two periods.7
7 See Appendix A for more information about control variables, summary statistics and issues concerning
data selection and cleansing.
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4. Results
4.1. Basic Exporter Wage Premia
Table 1 summarizes the results of two wage regressions for the basic exporter wage pre-
mium. The regressions differ with respect to their aggregation level: The one reported in
Column (1) only uses the establishment data while the one listed in Column (2) relies on
the whole linked employer-employee dataset.
The establishment-level wage regression conﬁrms the existence of an exporter wage
premium for the time period and dataset used here. The coefﬁcient for the variable cap-
turing whether an establishment is an exporter is positive and statistically signiﬁcant on
the one per cent level. Moreover, the exporter wage premium is not only statistically
but also economically signiﬁcant: Exporters pay almost ﬁve per cent higher wages than
non-exporters ceteris paribus.
Column (2) of Table 1 makes it clear that the basic exporter wage premium found with
the help of an establishment-level regression is not a result of biased estimates because
of observed or unobserved worker heterogeneity. On the contrary, an individual-level re-
gression again shows a coefﬁcient for an establishment’s export status that is both positive
and statistically highly signiﬁcant. What is different is the coefﬁcient’s size: According to
the individual-level wage regression, exporters on average pay “only” 0.8 per cent higher
wages than non-exporting establishments. However, this much lower coefﬁcient comes
as no surprise given the inclusion of spell ﬁxed effects that capture a large part of the
establishment-level wage variation. Individual-level wage regressions that do not include
such ﬁxed effects (available upon request) show coefﬁcients for the exporter status vari-
able that are in the same order of magnitude as those found for the estimation reported in
Column (1) of Table 1.
Concerning the control variables, most of them exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant co-
efﬁcient with the expected sign: For instance, employees with longer tenure as well as
master craftsmen and foremen and white-collar workers on average earn higher wages as
do workers with tertiary education and German citizenship. More capital per employee
and the existence of an establishment-wide bargaining agreement are also associated with
higher wages (the latter in the same order of magnitude as the exporter wage premium).
Besides, there is the expected inverse U-shaped relationship between wages and both an
establishment’s number of employees and the age of these employees.
A number of other covariates are not statistically signiﬁcantly associated with the wage
level or the sign of their coefﬁcient varies between the establishment- and the individual-
level wage regressions. This is the case for for the average weekly standard hours and for
the dummies capturing the existence of an industry-wide bargaining agreement or a wage
council.
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Table 1: Wage regressions for the basic exporter wage premium
(1) (2)
log (wages)
exporting establishment 0.0461*** 0.0061***
(0.0126) (0.0010)
log (number of employees) 0.1038*** 0.1941***
(0.0114) (0.0094)
log (number of employees)
2 –0.0141*** –0.0155***
(0.0015) (0.0008)
log (capital per employee) 0.0775*** 0.0032***
(0.0040) (0.0012)
average weekly standard hours 0.00002 –0.0003***
(0.0003) (0.00004)
industry-wide bargaining agreement 0.0220* –0.0015
(0.0122) (0.0012)
establishment-wide bargaining agreement 0.0548** 0.0071***
(0.0216) (0.0012)














vocational training; no high school – –0.0038
(0.0051)
high school; no vocational training – –0.0284
(0.0185)
high school and vocational training – –0.0050
(0.0127)












year ﬁxed effects yes yes
state ﬁxed effects yes no
industry ﬁxed effects yes no
spell ﬁxed effects no yes
N 8.079 729.930
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications in parentheses. *, (**), (***) indicates signiﬁcance at the 10, (5), (1)
per cent level. For a detailed description of variables used, see Section 3 and Appendix A.1.
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Table 2: Wage regressions for destination-speciﬁc exporter wage premia
(1) (2)
log (wages)
establishment exporting to EMU 0.0315** 0.0025***
(0.0131) (0.0009)
establishment exporting to NMS 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0161) (0.0007)
establishment exporting to ROW 0.0284* 0.0020**
(0.0156) (0.0008)
establishment controls yes yes
individual controls no yes
constant yes yes
year ﬁxed effects yes yes
state ﬁxed effects yes no
industry ﬁxed effects yes no
spell ﬁxed effects no yes
N 8.079 729.930
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications in parentheses. *, (**), (***) indicates signiﬁcance at the 10, (5), (1)
per cent level. For a detailed description of variables used, see Section 3 and Appendix A.1.
4.2. Destination-Speciﬁc Exporter Wage Premia
Now the focus will be shifted to an extended framework that distinguishes between three
different export destinations. Table 2 reports the results of two wage regressions that
include three dummy variables for whether an establishment exports to the eurozone, the
New EU Member States and the rest of the world as distinct regressors.8 Again, separate
regressions are reported for establishment-level wage regressions [Column (1)] and the
whole dataset [Column (2)].
For all three country groups, results from the establishment- and individual-level es-
timations are qualitatively identical. In both speciﬁcations, exporting to the EMU and
ROW is statistically signiﬁcantly associated with higher wages. The corresponding ex-
porter wage premia are also economically signiﬁcant: The establishment-level regression
shows that exporting to the EMU goes hand in hand with a 3.5 per cent increase in wages
ceteris paribus. Exporters to the ROW on average pay 2.8 per cent higher wages than
other establishments, a wage premium that does not differ statistically signiﬁcantly from
the one found for exporters to the EMU.
In contrast to what is found for the two other export destinations, exporters to the NMS
do not seem to pay higher wages. This is a result that the majority of New New Trade The-
ory models cannot easily rationalize, not even those like Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein
(2008) that allow for productivity thresholds to differ by export destination. However, ex-
tensions of the Melitz model that incorporate quality differentiation — e.g. Verhoogen
8 In this and the following sections, outputs for the establishment- and individual-level control variables
are not shown. They are available upon request.
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(2008) or Brambilla, Lederman and Porto (2010) — are able to explain how quality
downgrading might attenuate, eliminate or possibly even reverse the wage premium of
exporters from high-income Germany to the poorer New EU Member States.9
Table 3: Wage regressions for exporter wage premia and distances to destination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log (wages)
establishment exporting to EMU 0.0468** –0.0020 – –
(0.0186) (0.0014)
distance to EMU centroid –0.2953 – – –
(0.0282)
establishment exporting to EMU x –0.0036 0.0097*** – –
distance to EMU centroid (0.0207) (0.0020)
establishment exporting to NMS – – 0.0226 –0.0047***
(0.0168) (0.0010)
distance to NMS centroid – – 0.0279 –
(.0178)
establishment exporting to NMS x – – 0.0138 0.0098***
distance to NMS centroid (0.0243) (0.0013)
establishment controls yes yes yes yes
individual controls no yes no yes
constant yes yes yes yes
year ﬁxed effects yes yes yes yes
state ﬁxed effects yes no yes no
industry ﬁxed effects yes no yes no
spell ﬁxed effects no yes no yes
N 8.079 729.930 8.081 730.179
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications in parentheses. **, (***) indicates signiﬁcance at the 5, (1) per cent
level. For a detailed description of variables used, see Section 3 and Appendix A.1.
4.3. Exporter Wage Premia and Distances to Destination
This section analyzes the relationships between exporting, destinations and wages in
greater detail. More speciﬁcally, the distance dummy variables introduced in Section 3
are added to two separate wage regressions that evaluate the wage effects of exporting to
the eurozone and the New EU Member States, respectively. These distance dummies are
interacted with the variables capturing an establishment’s export status. The ultimate aim
is to test an implication of the model by Holmes and Stevens (2010), namely that those
exporters that ship their goods over the greatest distance are expected to pay higher wages
than other exporters.
9 An alternative comparison of establishments serving only the domestic market with those exporting
to the eurozone and those also exporting to destinations outside the EMU — along the lines of Wagner
(2007b) and Verardi and Wagner (2010) — shows that wages for exporters to the Euro area are higher than
for domestic ﬁrms but equal to those that also sell goods outside the EMU.
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WhileColumns(1)and(3)ofTable3focusontheestablishment-level, Columns(2)and
(4) summarize the corresponding wage regressions for the whole dataset. This time, re-
sults differ markedly between the two levels of aggregation. This stresses the importance
of using a linked employer-employee dataset for detailed investigations of the exporter
wage premium.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 report that in the establishment-level wage regressions
almost none of the relevant regressors (export status, distance and their interaction) sig-
niﬁcantly differ from zero. In contrast, regressions that take account of both the demand
and the supply side of the labor market — where the inﬂuence of distance as such is not
identiﬁed because of the spell ﬁxed effects — once again demonstrate the importance of
export status for determining workers’ wages. Interestingly, neither for the EMU nor for
the NMS do establishments relatively close to their export destination pay higher higher
wages than similar establishments that only serve the domestic market. On the contrary,
those close to the NMS even pay a signiﬁcantly negative wage premium.
Besides, interaction terms between distances and the respective export dummies are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant for both the EMU and the NMS. Thus establishments
exporting to but located relatively far away from these destinations pay higher wages than
other exporters. They also pay higher wages than non-exporters ceteris paribus.
A combination of the models by Verhoogen (2008) and Holmes and Stevens (2010)
might be the starting point for explaining why only those German exporters that are lo-
cated far away from their destination pay higher wages than non-exporters. In particular,
small ﬁxed costs of exporting inside the European Union and a low willingness to pay
for quality in EMU economies relative to Germany might lead to an insigniﬁcant wage
premium for German exporters shipping their goods to these countries over only a small
distance. If — as the last section suggests – consumers from New EU Member States
are even less willing to pay for quality than those from the eurozone, this might explain
why exporters to the NMS located close to this region pay a negative wage premium.
At the same time, sunk costs associated with distance could rationalize why establish-




This section checks whether the results presented above are robust to variations of
the empirical setup. Outputs are reported in Tables 4 and 5 which — for the sake of
brevity — focus on individual-level wage regressions. Table 4 deals with the basic ex-
porter wage premium and with destination-speciﬁc exporter wage premia. Table 5 is
concerned with the relationship between the exporter wage premium and the distance
between export origin and destination.
Bothtablesreport resultsforalternative speciﬁcations whereallobservationswith right-
censored wages are excluded from the regressions. Following Schank, Schnabel and
Wagner (2010) this is meant to make sure that results are not artiﬁcially generated by
the imputation of wages above the contribution assessment ceiling of Germany’s social
security system.
Table 4: Wage regressions for basic exporter wage premium and destination-speciﬁc ex-
porter wage premia (robustness)
(1) (2)
log (wages)
exporting establishment 0.0062*** –
(0.0008)
establishment exporting to EMU – 0.0038***
(0.0009)
establishment exporting to NMS – –0.0003
(0.0006)




Notes: Establishment controls, individual controls, constant, year ﬁxed effects and spell ﬁxed effects always included.
Bootstrap standard errors with 200 replications in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 per cent level. For a
detailed description of variables used, see Section 3 and Appendix A.1.
A number of other sensitivity checks evaluate whether the distance measures used in
Section 4.3 correctly reﬂect the distance between export origin and destination. This
might be questioned on the grounds that these measures are based on German establish-
ments’ exports to rather broad country groups instead of speciﬁc economies.
A ﬁrst alternative speciﬁcation shown in Table 5 relies on centroids of the eurozone
and the New EU Member States that are calculated by weighting countries’ GDPs at
Purchasing Power Parity instead of converting them to euros at going exchange rates.
Next, the median distance to the EMU/NMS centroid is no longer used to determine
the cutoff for classifying an establishment as “close to” or “far away from” its export
destination. Instead, either one of two alternative dummies are included in the wage
regressions: The ﬁrst is set to one only for those establishments that are further away from
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their export destination than 75 per cents of establishments. For the second, the value of
one is assigned to all but the 25 per cent of establishments closest to the respective export
destination.
Finally, all establishments are dropped for which it is not really clear whether they are
far away from their export destination or not. More speciﬁcally, for pairs of every single
NMS country and all German counties dummy variables are created that take a value
of one if the country-county distance is greater than the median distance between the
country and all German counties. Next, for every county the arithmetic mean of these
dummy variables (weighted by NMS countries’ GDPs in euro) is calculated. This gives
a measure of whether a certain county is far away from the universe of New EU Member
States or not. In a ﬁnal step, only establishments located in those German counties are
included in a wage regression for which this measure is greater than 0.75 or smaller than
0.25. That is, only establishments are included which are either comparatively close to
or comparatively far away from the large majority of NMS. An analogue procedure is
followed for the eurozone.
As Tables 4 and 5 show, all results are qualitatively and also quantitatively robust to the
alternative speciﬁcations presented here. The basic exporter wage premium continues to
be conﬁrmed and even if observations with right-censored wages are excluded exporters
to the EMU and ROW countries still pay comparatively higher wages while those to the
NMS do not. Moreover, exporters further away from their destination pay higher wages
than other exporters and non-exporters in nine out of ten alternative speciﬁcations. Also
in nine out of ten alternative speciﬁcations, exporters which are relatively close to their
destination continue to pay the same or even lower wages than non-exporters.10,11
10 The one result that does not match, concerns exporters to the eurozone: if one only classiﬁes those
establishments that are further away from the EMU centroid than 75 per cents of establishments as “far”
away from the eurozone, the signs of both relevant coefﬁcients are reversed.
11 In addition to the alternative speciﬁcations summarized in Tables 4 and 5, one might wonder what would
happen if the observation period was expanded. While detailed information on exports to the NMS are
not available in the LIAB for years other than the ones used throughout this study, the dataset allows an
extension of the sample period for the basic exporter wage premium. In stark contrast to economic theory
[but in line with results by Baumgarten (2010)] the more the observation period is extended back into
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6. Conclusions
This study used detailed, reliable and up-to-date linked employer-employee data that take
account of both the demand and the supply side of the German labor market to reconsider
the exporter wage premium. It found that exporters pay higher wages than non-exporters




showed that a positive exporter wage premium is always present for longer distances
between an export’s origin and its destination but that exporters located close to their
destination pay the same or even lower wages than non-exporters.
The basic conﬁrmation of an exporter wage premium is in line with standard New New
Trade Theory models like Melitz (2003). In contrast, some of the other ﬁndings challenge
the conventional wisdom. The most parsimonious New New Trade Theory models cannot
easily explain why exporters to certain countries or those located relatively close to their
export destination should pay the same or even lower wages than non-exporters ceteris
paribus. However, these results are in line with richer models that combine heterogenous
ﬁrms and endogenous exporting activity with asymmetric countries, quality differentia-
tion or sunk costs associated with distance [cf. Verhoogen (2008), Brambilla, Lederman
and Porto (2010) and Holmes and Stevens (2010)]. More research — and preferably even
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A. Appendix: Data and Variables
A.1. Control Variables
On the establishment level the following control variables are included in the wage re-
gressions of Sections 4 and 5:
– The number of employees subject to social security contributions and the square of
this variable. Larger establishments could be expected to be more productive and
therefore to pay higher wages in the presence of rent-sharing, a view theoretically
derived by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) and others and empirically
conﬁrmedforinstancebyMáñez-Castillejo, Rochina-BarrachinaandSanchis-Llopis
(2010).
– The capital per employees subject to social security contributions. The IAB Estab-
lishment Survey does not directly contain any information on establishments’ cap-
ital stocks. Therefore this study relies on the capital stock approximation method
developed by Müller (2008). This method relies an a modiﬁed perpetual inventory
approach and provides reliable measures for capital input when a short panel is used
and no direct information on capital input is available. A priori one might expect
more capital-intensive establishments to pay higher wages.
– The average weekly standard hours. For years where this information is not available
in the IAB Establishment Panel the average value of the preceding and following
years are used for those establishments that are covered by the Panel during all three
years. Otherwise, a missing value is attributed to this variable. Higher average
standard hours should — more or less mechanically — be associated with higher
wages.
– Dummy variables for the existence of an industry- or establishment-wide collective
bargaining agreement. The existence of such collective bargaining agreements might
be associated with rent-sharing between an establishment and its employees and
therefore with higher wages.
– A dummy variable for the presence of a wage council. The existence of a wage
council might again be a sign of rent-sharing between an establishment and its em-
ployees.
When the whole linked employer-employee dataset is used, a number of additional
control variables are included in order to account of observed individual heterogeneity.
These are:
– Individual age and the square of this variable. A positive but decreasing wage pre-
mium of age is a stylized fact from human capital theory and can also be expected
here.
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– Job tenure and the square of this variable. Human capital theory would predict a
positive (but possibly decreasing) effect of tenure on wages
– The education level captured by ﬁve dummy variables that measure whether an in-
dividual holds a degree from vocational training but no high school diploma, a high
school diploma but no degree from vocational training, a high school diploma and a
degree from vocational training, a degree from a technical college or a university de-
gree. The control group consists of those individuals that hold neither a high school
diploma nor a degree from vocational training. As with age and tenure, education is
included because human capital theory predicts that it should inﬂuence wages. More
speciﬁcally, better-educated workers should earn higher wages ceteris paribus.
– A dummy variable for German nationality. Especially because of possible discrimi-
nation by employers, German citizens might earn higher wages than other workers.
– Dummyvariablesforthestatusasmastercraftsman/foremanorwhite-collarworker.
Employees who have the status of a master craftsman or a foreman or are employed
as white-collar workers could a priori be expected to earn higher wages.
Moreover, this study captures possible industry effects by including 33 industry dum-
mies in the establishment-level regressions. In order to account for region-speciﬁc effects,
establishment-level regressions also include dummy variables for Germany’s 16 federal
states. Additionally, year dummies are present in both establishment- and individual-level
regressions. The latter also include “spell” ﬁxed effects, where “spells” are deﬁned as
unique employee-establishment combinations. This approach was proposed by Abowd,
Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and accounts for both establishment and individual (time-
invariant) unobserved heterogeneity.
A.2. Data Selection and Cleansing
Concerningdataselectionandcleansing, non-competitiveindustries[asdeﬁnedbyMüller
(2008)] are excluded from the analysis. Also, only those establishments are analyzed that
report the volume of sales as the measure of their business volume (as opposed to total
assets or similar measures used by some ﬁnancial corporations).
On the individual level, most employees not covered by social security — like civil
servants, family workers and self-employed persons — are not included in the IAB reg-
ister data. Additionally, spells of marginal employment and home-work are excluded as
are employment spells with a wage below the marginal part-time income threshold. It is
likely that for many of these employment spells the wage information is corrupt. Spells
during which the individual works as an apprentice, an intern or is in partial retirement
are not considered either.
After all this data cleansing and in particular the exclusion of observations with missing
values for one or more variables, the estimation sample consists of 8079 data points on
the establishment level. On the individual level, the sample size is 729,930.
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A.3. Summary Statistics
Table 6 presents summary statistics on this study’s main variables on the establishment
and individual level. It shows amongst many other things that about 33 per cent of the
establishments covered export in any given year. One should, however, keep in mind that
the IAB Establishment Panel relies on a stratiﬁed sample of German establishments —
where the strata are deﬁned over industries and plant sizes — and that this stratiﬁcation
probably overestimates the propensity to export.
Table 6: Summary statistics for establishment- and individual-level variables
variable mean std. dev. minimum maximum
exporting establishment 0.32 – 0 1
ratio of total exports to sales 10.06 20.99 0 100
establishment exporting to EMU 0.29 – 0 1
ratio of EMU exports to sales 5.26 12.14 0 100
establishment exporting to NMS 0.13 – 0 1
ratio of NMS exports to sales 1.00 4.03 0 93
establishment exporting to ROW 0.20 – 0 1
ratio of ROW exports to sales 3.80 11.99 0 100
log (wages per employee) 7.96 0.51 5.69 11.76
log (number of employees) 3.21 1.65 0 10.54
log (capital per employee) 10.77 1.63 3.17 18.07
average weekly standard hours 39.13 2.19 13.0 80.0
industry-wide bargaining agreement 0.42 – 0 1
establishment-wide bargaining agreement 0.07 – 0 1
wage council 0.29 – 0 1
log (wages) 4.59 0.42 2.53 6.45
age 41.59 9.75 16 79
tenure 3898.64 2940.09 1 11504
no vocational training; no high school 0.14 – 0 1
vocational training; no high school 0.69 – 0 1
high school; no vocational training 0.01 – 0 1
high school and vocational training 0.04 – 0 1
technical college 0.05 – 0 1
university 0.07 – 0 1
master craftsman / foreman 0.04 – 0 1
white-collar 0.38 – 0 1
German nationality 0.93 – 0 1
For a detailed description of variables used, see Section 3 and Appendix A.1.
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